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Imperial Delusions
Tariq Ali
The most startling aspect of the 21st century—something that is 
genuinely new—is that we have, for the first time in human history, the 
existence of a single Empire. This is not the abstract utopian Empire 
of Hardt-Negri, but something very concrete and real. The dominant 
position of the United States has no precedent in history, which is why 
Niall Ferguson’s assertion that China and Russia are imperial states is 
completely unconvincing. The figures speak for themselves: there are 
189 member states of the United Nations while there is a U.S. military 
presence in some 140 countries. The increase of $8 billion in the U.S. 
military budget in 2002 was the equivalent of China’s total military 
expenditure. U.S. military spending is greater than the annual GDP of 
Russia, India, Brazil, and much of Europe.
We are closer now than ever before to the ultra-imperialism pre-
dicted by Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretician of German socialism 
of the early 20th century. Kautsky’s text, Der Imperialismus, was written 
before the outbreak of the First World War, but published during its 
early months, despite the fact that the war itself—a classic demon-
stration of inter-imperialist contradictions—had dynamited Kautsky’s 
central thesis, namely, that the latest phase of capitalist development 
would abolish inter-imperialist conflicts forever.1
Kautsky insisted on publishing his text, and for good reason. He 
believed that the growing rise of anti-colonial movements in Asia and 
the Arab East would compel imperialism to close ranks against a com-
mon enemy. He argued that the arms race would become an unaccept-
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able burden on capitalism, necessitating a strategy of peace, not war, 
between the major imperialist powers. On this last point, of course, 
he was proved wrong. Military spending helped to protect capitalism 
after the Depression of the 1930s, as demonstrated by Germany, Japan, 
and the United States.
It would take another inter-imperialist war to bring the capitalist 
world to its senses. The refusal of German imperialism to accept the 
division of the world into British and French zones brought about the 
Second World War. Its spread to the Soviet Union and Asia created the 
basis for the spread of revolution. Vietnam, China, Korea, and Indone-
sia benefited from the inter-imperialist conflicts. It was only after the 
defeat of Germany and Japan that the capitalist world accepted U.S. 
leadership, though former rivals secretly celebrated U.S. defeats in 
Cuba and Vietnam. Nonetheless, the existence of a Communist world 
forced capitalism to discipline its competitive urges in the politico-
military sphere. The U.S., uniquely in the history of empires, rebuilt its 
defeated and war-devastated rivals: German, Japanese, and West Euro-
pean capitalism. In return, these states accepted U.S. leadership. In 
Kautsky’s words, the result of the World War between the great impe-
rialist powers could be a federation of the strongest, who renounce 
their arms race. What he predicted after the first global conflict actually 
happened after the Second World War. However, as long as the non-
capitalist world existed, there was still some space for maneuver. The 
Scandinavians and the French under de Gaulle were strongly opposed 
to the U.S. war in Vietnam and not a single NATO country dispatched 
troops to help the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 changed all that and brought 
about a new unarmed struggle for hegemony. There could only be one 
victor: the United States. The major European states might moan and 
grumble and search eagerly for crumbs of comfort (multilateralism, the 
U.N., etc.), but U.S. politico-military hegemony was unchallengeable. 
The British and Italian leaders accepted this and positioned themselves 
permanently in the posterior of the U.S. Empire. Despite this, the old 
spectre could not be completely exorcised.
A new question arose. Given that there is no real enemy to unite the 
capitalist world (the notion of Islam as an enemy is ludicrous), might 
not inter-imperialist contradictions re-emerge? And, horror of horrors, 
might they lead to war? This question was not posed by isolated Marx-
ists in the Western academies. It was first raised in the White House 
during the reign of George Bush I. An Afghan-American ideologue, 
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Zalmay Khalilzad, published an essay in which he suggested that U.S. 
hegemony had to be preserved at all costs, if necessary by force! The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia (a direct result of global economics and 
inter-imperialist rivalries within the European Union) consumed the 
Clinton White House. U.S. intervention in the Yugoslav civil war was 
an assertion of raw power. Rwanda, where a real genocide was in 
motion, was ignored.
*****
During the first half of the 20th century, when the British still occu-
pied India and a nationalist movement had erupted against the British 
Empire, sundry U.S. journalists were dispatched to observe the scene 
and interview Mahatma Gandhi. “What,” one of them asked the Indian 
leader, “do you think of Western civilization?” The old fox smiled. “It 
would be a good idea,” he replied. Seventy-five years later, Iraqis suf-
fering the abuses of an oppressive first year under the U.S. occupation 
would probably endorse Gandhi’s sentiment.
To sell the Iraq installment of the war against terrorism, the U.S. 
had justified it as necessary to free the good and common people from 
a tyrant. Once removed, and with the benefit not of foreign nation-
builders but of bureaucrats to ease the transition, the path would clear, 
swords would be turned into ploughshares, and the desert would 
bloom in a transformed and democratized Middle East. If at home 
President Bush and his cadre of acolytes were merchants of fear, on the 
road, to justify foreign adventures, Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld and colleagues were merchants of hope.
Many in the West hoped that the U.S. intervention in Iraq would 
lead to democracy. Few in Iraq suffered such illusions. They were only 
too aware that at the height of the repression in Iraq, Saddam Hussein 
had been a favored Western ally, barely criticized in the U.S. media. 
What has happened has confirmed Iraqi doubts. At a single nod from 
the conquerors, timeservers such as Ahmed Chalabi (aptly described in 
The New Yorker as the man “who sold the war”) are reduced to primi-
tive obscurity. Saddam’s former ally (whom Saddam later tried to have 
killed), the ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi, is the new puppet prime minister. 
All this is welcomed by the “international community,” showing once 
again that it is the wealth and military strength of the U.S. that enables 
it to buy the services of poorer and weaker states.
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In any case, with the revelations of the abuses at prisons in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Cuba, the U.S. has lost whatever moral authority it 
purported to have, and the result is a genuine clash of civilizations—
one that easily could have been avoided.
In the spring of 1917, when the British entered Iraq, the statement 
of purpose was similarly virtuous. The generals and their battalions 
came not as conquerors but as liberators. To allow that controlling Iraq 
was part of a grander design to secure the Middle East as a European 
access route to Asia would have divested the occupying force of the 
moral authority necessary for success. Always, the occupier requires a 
mask as the benign bestower of a better life, a better “civilization.”
The British, of course, had assets the U.S. lacks. One was a long and 
storied colonial legacy rooted in a commitment to settlement. Legions 
decamped from the British Isles to populate the globe. At home, they 
were the marginalized, the impoverished, the outcasts; abroad, they 
became the pioneers, the entrepreneurs, the pirates. Through the inge-
nious workings of mercantilism they filled the treasury of Westmin-
ster with ever-ballooning capital and established Britain as the world’s 
banker. Most importantly, the British embraced their empire as a righ-
teous, utilitarian, and civilizing force.
In contrast, latter-day Americans suffer from intellectual and histori-
cal amnesia, and a sense of denial bordering on the delusional. Despite 
U.S. insistence to the contrary, we have the existence of a single empire. 
It is the American Empire at the beginning of the “New American 
Century.” The U.S. military is stationed in 138 countries. In key geopo-
litical regions such as the Middle East, it secures strategic partnerships 
through the provision of defense services, military hardware, and cor-
porate investment. This is especially true in Israel and Saudi Arabia, 
the Middle Eastern bête noires for Muslim fundamentalists. Israel is a 
false economy, more and more dependent on Western capital inflows 
and by the day losing its claim to being the region’s only democracy. In 
Saudi Arabia, U.S. corporate investments exceed $400 million a year, 
and U.S. companies have more than two hundred joint ventures (prin-
cipally in the petrochemical and energy sectors) with Saudi Arabian 
companies. Certainly support for Israel opens the door to Islamic and 
Arab charges that the West aids and abets the unlawful occupation and 
confinement of Palestinians. But, post-Iraq, all indications now suggest 
that the longstanding reciprocity between the U.S. and the House of 
Saud—to Islamic critics, oil in exchange for military bases in the home 
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of Mecca and Medina—will result in Saudi Arabia’s becoming a new 
hotbed and target of Islamic militancy.
In the absence of a system wherein the financial benefits of foreign 
investment accrue directly to the U.S. treasury, the costs of maintain-
ing and expanding this empire should be the key issue in the 2004 U.S. 
presidential election. Notwithstanding the U.S.’s status as the world’s 
largest debtor nation, the present administration appears committed to 
military budgets in excess of the next fifteen largest nations combined. 
What, after all, is this global overreach putting at risk? If the econo-
mists are correct, how can social security checks, state medical insur-
ance, the welfare state, and so on, be sustained in the face of a balance 
sheet that reads $45 trillion in the hole? But, given the administration’s 
refusal to use the “E” word, President Bush’s beliefs in divine guidance 
and “might is right,” and only faint challenges from American liberals 
to U.S. imperial aspirations, it is hard to imagine a change of course.
The most recent evidence of historical amnesia and a messiah com-
plex lies in the lack of a measured exit strategy following “Operation 
Iraqi Freedom,” a war whose rapid result could have been guessed by 
grade-school children. (Tony Blair knew that it would be a long haul. 
The complicity in this charade by the British prime minister, whose 
country’s earlier occupation of Iraq lurched on until 1955, proves that 
the diseases of blind faith and hubris have spread across the Atlantic.) 
But there is more to it. The absence of planning bespeaks a collective 
mind existing in a permanent present, and an adolescent insistence 
that “history begins with us.”
Contributing to this permanent present are television and the Inter-
net, two “assets” the colonial British were free of, and it is these tools of 
communication that have caused the U.S. to lose both the propaganda 
war and its moral authority. (After Gulf War I, embedding journalists 
was a brilliant strategic ploy, which, with rare exceptions, success-
fully contained the story for the homeland audience. In hindsight, 
this may have been the only “mission accomplished.”) In the inter-
regnum between President Bush’s proclamation of victory and the day 
of uneasy transition to a dubious Iraqi self-rule, the bombs and body 
counts continued to soar and the negative news became a daily head-
line. The image is more powerful than the word, and matters reached 
their nadir when the torture photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison 
were broadcast on Arab television and released over the Internet. The 
damage could not be controlled; the mask was off. On the ground, the 
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liberators suddenly looked no better than the Baathist thugs of Sad-
dam Hussein’s security militias.
The Taguba Inquiry confirmed independent reports that U.S. sol-
diers had raped women prisoners. Some of them were forced to bare 
their breasts for the camera. The women detainees sent messages to 
the resistance, pleading with them to bomb and destroy the prison and 
obliterate their shame and suffering. As far back as November 2003, 
word was getting out. Early in 2004, The Guardian reported a woman 
prisoner pleading, “We have daughters and husbands. For God’s sake 
don’t tell anyone about this.” Another Iraqi prisoner, a male, was more 
forthright: “We need electricity in our homes, not up the arse.” This 
was Western civilization at its most raw, and reprisals were inevitable.
Circulating on the streets of Baghdad is a photograph of a U.S. 
soldier having sex with an Iraqi woman: War as pornography. In the 
West, this and similar images have been suppressed. (Was it out of 
deference to John Ashcroft, the U.S. Attorney General, a fanatical evan-
gelist who blushed each day when he saw the stone breasts of the gor-
geous Spirit of Justice in the hallway outside his office and so had them 
covered?) Was the Pentagon fearful of the reaction from the world 
at large? And what about the women of Afghanistan, who, we were 
informed only a few years ago by the White House First Ladies Hillary 
Clinton and Laura Bush, would be liberated by invasion and occupa-
tion? The women are still waiting, while rapes and tortures in that 
country go unreported.
Into this amoral terrain, the other side responded with eye-for-an-
eye justice. The Iraqi resistance responded to the U.S. rapes and torture 
with kidnappings, car bombings targeting U.S. military and civilians 
alike, and, in Saudi Arabia (because, to the resistance, this war is bor-
derless), ritualized beheadings of Western hostages. At first, the images 
of rape and torture trickled out (shame seemingly keeping their repro-
duction in check), but the opportunity to exploit these hideous trans-
gressions was too ripe, too available, and the slow seepage became a 
flood. Newly equipped, local mullahs, clerics from neighboring states, 
and others demanding the immediate evacuation of the “Western 
infidels” busily recast the short history of the war: Since Gulf War I, 
the West has been bombing Iraq; economic sanctions, not the Baathist 
regime, crippled its opportunity; and only we can protect the proud 
face of Islam against the Christian hordes. One can hear the chant: “I 
ask you, which civilization, Islam or the West, is collapsing?”
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I was in Egypt and Lebanon when news of the Abu Ghraib torture 
broke. I did not meet a single person (not even among Europeans and 
North Americans who work there) who was surprised. Outside the 
U.S., the echoes of history have never ceased to resonate. The tortures 
in Iraq revived memories of Aden and Algeria, Vietnam, and, yes, 
Palestine. But what can explain the shock evinced by so many in the 
West when the torture was made public? One can excuse forgetting 
the Inquisition or the Ordeal by Fire or the heresy-hunters of Christi-
anity who tortured and killed Cathars and Albigensians, or, later, the 
majestic polemic by Voltaire against the cruelty of torture. But have 
the citizens of North America forgotten what happened in South and 
Central America, Asia, and Africa less than fifty years ago? When dead 
Iraqis are not even counted, why the surprise that the living ones are 
mistreated? To understand this collective amnesia we must, against the 
strongest impulses of a U.S. administration intoxicated by the future, 
straddle the present while stepping back in time.
On June 8, 2004, The Financial Times reported that U.S. lawyers said, 
“American interrogators can legally violate a U.S. ban on the use of 
torture abroad,” and “legal statutes against torture could not override 
Mr. Bush’s inherent powers.” From leaked administration documents, 
it is now clear that the U.S. justification for torture at Abu Ghraib 
(and at Guantanamo Bay) was predicated on the notion that Al-Qaida 
“irregulars” do not observe, and therefore cannot be covered by, the 
laws of war. In the battle against these anarchic warriors—this asym-
metric devil intent on destruction—the U.S. sought to circumvent not 
only the Geneva Conventions but also its own 1996 U.S. War Crimes 
Act. It is pointless to pretend that the implicated GIs were indulging 
in spontaneous fun. The soldiers were wrong to obey orders, but who 
will punish their leaders?
Collective memory loss in the West could be the result of a superi-
ority complex. We won. We defeated the “Evil Empire.” Our culture, 
our civilization is infinitely more advanced than anything else—which 
might explain the shock waves created by the torture revelations at 
Abu Ghraib. One of the features of domination is that those who do 
not identify with it are categorized as the enemy. George W. Bush’s 
post-September 11 injunction, “If you’re not with us, you’re with the 
terrorists,” was, for a while, accepted without question throughout the 
Western world and by elites everywhere. It was merely an adaptation 
of the New Testament’s, “He who is not with me is against me.” The 
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notion that he might not be against you but in favor of something more 
constructive was/is regarded as impermissible.
It was Carl Schmitt, a gifted legal theorist of the Third Reich, who 
insisted that the totality of politics was encompassed by the essential 
categories of “friend” and “enemy.” This view suited most empires 
and Schmitt’s writings were influential in the United States after the 
Second World War. Conservative thinkers such as Leo Strauss acknowl-
edged his influence. The message—studied, learned, and adopted by 
the “Straussians” now surrounding President Bush—was straightfor-
ward: if your country does not serve the interests of our empire, it is an 
enemy state. It must be occupied, its leaders removed, and more pliant 
satraps placed on the throne. In time, they hoped, the presence of a 
Roman legion would become unnecessary. However, soon after the 
legion withdraws, the satrapy begins to crumble. Occupation, with-
drawal, rebellion, another occupation, and, sometimes, self-emancipa-
tion, is a pattern in world history.
To justify their excesses, imperial regimes require intellectual legiti-
mizers. In the U.S., the torch was passed from Leo Strauss and the Chi-
cago School to Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Huntington 
was a senior counterinsurgency expert in the Johnson administration at 
the time of the Vietnam War. His fertile imagination contributed to the 
scheme of “strategic hamlets,” after studying the insurgent texts of the 
enemy—Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Vo Nguyen Giap—
on guerrilla warfare in which all four practitioners explained that suc-
cess was impossible without the support of the population. Failing to 
understand what motivated the guerrilla fighters or the causes of the 
war, and believing the main problem was the links of the resistance to 
the people (“fish in water,” according to Mao), Huntington conceived 
of separating the two. The scheme envisaged herding poor peasants 
into “strategic hamlets,” which were glorified rural concentration 
camps surrounded by barbed wire and guarded day and night by sol-
diers. The U.S. military decided to give it a try. What Huntington and 
his superiors had failed to grasp was that many of “the people” were, 
in fact, members or supporters of the Vietnamese resistance. Soon they 
began to organize inside the strategic hamlets. The weaknesses of each 
hamlet were mapped and dispatched to the guerrillas, and the scheme 
came to an ignominious end.
Fukuyama did not engage in anything as dramatic. However, as 
a State Department employee, he wrote a policy paper on Pakistan 
during the years of General Zia’s brutal dictatorship. He suggested 
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that Pakistan turn its back on India and concentrate on its links with 
the Islamic world, i.e., the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The generals 
were grateful for this advice, which suited their material and strate-
gic needs, and they admired Fukuyama’s démarche. When the Berlin 
Wall came down, a new version of an old idea—the triumph of liberal 
democracy—began to agitate Fukuyama.
Then came the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the restora-
tion of a peculiar form of gangster capitalism in that world. Did the 
triumph of capitalism and the defeat of an enemy ideology mean we 
were in a world without conflict or enemies? Both Fukuyama and 
Huntington produced important books responding to the new situa-
tion. Fukuyama, obsessed with Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capital-
ism as the only embodiment of the “world-spirit” that now marked the 
“end of history,” a phrase that became the title of his book. The long 
war was over and the restless world-spirit could now relax and buy 
a condo in Miami. Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any 
available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, poli-
tics, and economics of the Other—each and every variety of Socialism/
Marxism—had disappeared under the ocean, a submerged continent 
of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irrevers-
ible. It was a universal triumph.
Huntington was unconvinced, however, and warned against com-
placency. From his Harvard base, he challenged Fukuyama with a set 
of theses first published in Foreign Affairs as “The Clash of Civiliza-
tions?” (a phrase originally coined by Bernard Lewis, another favorite 
of the current administration). Subsequently, these papers became a 
book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The 
question mark had now disappeared. Huntington agreed that no ideo-
logical alternatives to capitalism existed, but this did not mean the 
“end of history.” Other antagonisms remained: “The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cul-
tural… . The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.” In 
particular, Huntington emphasized the continued importance of reli-
gion in the modern world, and it was this that propelled the book onto 
the bestseller lists after September 11.
What did he mean by the word “civilization”? Early in the last 
century, Oswald Spengler, the grandson of a German miner, had aban-
doned his vocation as a teacher, turned to philosophy and history, and 
produced a master text. In The Decline of the West, Spengler counter-
posed culture (a word philologically tied to nature, the countryside, 
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and peasant life) with civilization, which is urban and would become 
the site of industrial anarchy, dooming both capitalist and worker to a 
life of slavery to the machine-master. For Spengler, civilization reeked 
of death and destruction and imperialism. Democracy was the dicta-
torship of money and “money is overthrown and abolished only by 
blood.” The advent of “Caesarism” would drown democracy in blood 
and become the final episode in the history of the West. Had the Third 
Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the 
spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk, 
and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are 
buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or the 
Ardennes), Spengler’s prediction might have come close to realization.
Spengler was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism, 
and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not its 
language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage:
I see, in a place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a 
number of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from 
the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound through-
out its whole lifecycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its 
own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, 
will and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, move-
ments, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures, 
peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks 
and stone-pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has its 
own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and 
never return… . 2
In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive cycle of civiliza-
tion:
Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species 
of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death follow-
ing life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built 
petrifying world city following mother-earth…they are an end, irrevo-
cable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again… . Imperialism 
is civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the 
West is now irrevocably set… . Expansionism is a doom, something dae-
monic and intense, which grips, forces into service and uses up the late 
humanity of the world-city stage.3
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Three-quarters of a century later, Huntington returned to Speng-
lerian themes but inverted their message. He amalgamated culture 
and civilization. For him, a civilization is a metaculture, “the highest 
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity 
people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other spe-
cies.” Huntington’s chart of the top eight cultures/civilizations consists 
of Western, Sino/Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Ortho-
dox, Latin American, and, reluctantly, African. (The reluctance is due 
to an inner voice that injects doubt as to whether Africa really qualifies 
as a civilization.) Religion is “perhaps the central force that motivates 
and mobilizes people.” The gulf is between “the West and the Rest.” 
The West is the only civilization that defends freedom, democracy, and 
the free market, while the rest resist Western efforts to advance these 
noble values. The West is at the height of its power and, argues Hun-
tington, utilizes the United Nations and the International Monetary 
Fund to impose its will globally. He discards the notion of a real dif-
ference between unilateralism and multilateralism because “the very 
phrase the ‘world community’ has become the euphemistic collective 
noun to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the 
United States and other Western powers.” He is correct on this, if not 
on religion.
I do not believe that faith is the main determinant of global mass 
mobilizations. It plays a part, the extent of which is variable. The West 
is certainly divided on this. Europe is not deeply religious, whereas in 
the U.S., the situation is the reverse. According to the latest surveys, 
95% of Americans believe in God, including 91% of those who define 
themselves as liberals. (A recent Gallup briefing [February 25, 2003] 
reveals a bipartisan belief in the horned one. The Democrats are so 
pious that 67% of them actually believe in the Devil, only twelve per-
centage points below the Republicans. This tickles me because “Who 
believes in the Devil,” wrote Thomas Mann in Doctor Faustus, “already 
belongs to him.”) Neither in China nor Russia does religion play a sim-
ilar role, and I am convinced there are more unbelievers in the house of 
Islam than can ever be counted in public, but this is a theme to which I 
shall return below.
In Huntington’s world, the most dangerous combination would be 
the unity of Confucian and Islamic civilizations, neither of which shares 
the West’s attachment to human rights. And both of which, he might 
have added, could hold the West to ransom. The U.S. global strategy 
necessitates control of the world’s oil reserves, while domestically its 
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economy is heavily dependent on cheap imports from China. Wary of 
China, the U.S. is pushing to open it up for business, and betting that 
the steamroller of American culture and product selling will take hold. 
The Chinese masses, it is hoped, will be satiated by shopping.
Soon after Huntington’s book appeared, others joined the fray and 
stressed the importance of cultural differences in understanding poli-
tics, economics, demography, and so on. Much of this was sidelined 
after September 11 focused the debate on the “threat of radical Islam” 
and the “war against terror.” Instead of the West against the Rest, the 
new turn made it the Rest versus Islam. Huntington, to his credit, 
was not tempted by the neoconservative arguments dominating White 
House ideology before the debacle in Iraq. He modified his own views 
and argued that it was a clash within Islam that was the main problem 
and not one of civilizations. This was not the case either, but certainly 
made one wonder how this could be squared with his view that “faith 
and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what 
they will fight and die for.”
What is this Islam, this new bogeyman used to frighten the chil-
dren? The very idea of Islam as an institutional matrix that organizes 
terror and resistance to the West throughout the globe is a travesty of 
past and present. For most of the 20th century, organized or political 
Islam was, more often than not, supportive of the British Empire, and 
later, its American successor. It was a conservative social force, rattling 
the chains of superstition and fanaticism to stifle even the most fragile 
tremors of radical revolution. Throughout the Cold War, the Wahhabi 
preachers of Saudi Arabia (currently viewed as Enemy No.1) were dis-
patched across the Muslim world to preach the virtues of religion and 
counterrevolution. Where divine truth would not prevail over reason, 
there were always purses pregnant with petrodollars to help win new 
recruits. Where neither worked, the U.S. organized a military coup. 
One such case was Indonesia.
At college in Pakistan during the early 1960s, Muslim socialists like 
me were in a permanent debate with the Islamists, who would declare 
that religion and the state were indivisible because “Islam is a complete 
code of life.” We used to laugh when we heard this sentence and often 
preempt them by mouthing it ourselves in parrot fashion. Sometimes, 
when debates became heated, we would ask, “Which is the largest 
Muslim country in the world?” Back would come the reply, “Indone-
sia!” Another question would be hurled back by our side, “Which is 
the largest Communist Party in the non-communist world?” Silence. 
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We would chant in unison, “The Communist Party of Indonesia.” 
These youthful exchanges were not pure banter. We were arguing that 
it was perfectly possible to be part of Muslim culture and appreciate its 
finer points without being a believer. The Indonesian Left (more than a 
million-and-a-half strong) was wiped out in 1965 by General Suharto. 
It was one of the worst massacres of the Cold War, fully backed by the 
U.S. The vacuum in Indonesia created by the massacres left the field 
clear for the Army and the Islamists. The same pattern, if not on the 
same scale, occurred elsewhere.
I remember well the mood that gripped Pakistan during 1969–70. A 
three-month-long rebellion against a pro-U.S. military dictator by stu-
dents, workers, and peasants had triggered a societal upsurge. Lawyers 
took to the streets one day, prostitutes the next. The dictatorship crum-
bled and the country’s first-ever general election took place. Through-
out the campaign the secular, socialist currents dominated politics. 
The religious groups were totally marginalized and often resorted to 
violence. As a visiting academic, when I arrived in Multan to address a 
rally of nearly fifty thousand workers and peasants, the student wing 
of the Jamaati-Islami physically attacked the group of students who 
had come to meet me at the airport and escort me to the meeting. They 
stoned us as the police stood by and watched. This was a common 
occurrence in those days, but the intimidation didn’t work.
The 1970 Pakistani elections saw the Islamists wiped out as a political 
force. When, in 1972, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was address-
ing a rally in Lahore, a group of mullahs started abusing him. Bhutto, 
who often spoke at several meetings a day, had an attendant who car-
ried a tiny whisky flask and when the prime-ministerial voice became 
too hoarse, a glass containing amber liquid would appear and relieve 
the prime minister’s exhaustion. At the Lahore rally there were half-a-
million people present as well as diplomats and foreign journalists. As 
Bhutto sipped from the glass, a bearded man stood up, pointed at him, 
and shouted, “Look, people. See what he is drinking.” Bhutto, who 
loved repartee, held up the glass and declared, “Yes, look. It’s sherbet.” 
The crowd roared with laughter. The well-placed mullahs stood up in 
different places and replied, “It’s sharab (alcohol).” Finally Bhutto lost 
his temper and shouted, “Fine. Yes, you mother***, it is sharab. Unlike 
you, I don’t drink the blood of the people.” The crowd was ecstatic. A 
spontaneous chant arose and rent the air: “Long may our Bhutto live! 
Long may our Bhutto drink!”
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Times are different now, but not just in the Islamic world. I empha-
size these very different events in Indonesia and Pakistan to show 
that the two largest Muslim states were subjected to the same political 
storms and influences as the non-Muslim world. I am no apologist 
for radical Islam, the widespread corruption of Islamic kingdoms, the 
atavistic mullahs and Quranic literalists, or the utter venality of the 
House of Saud. But if Muslim civilization has become a spent force 
(see Bernard Lewis’ What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle East-
ern Response) in need of top-down reform, one must eschew political 
agendas and deconstruct what actually happened. We require a social 
vision that transcends religious conservatism in the Islamic world, and 
the American model simply will not work. It has proven itself an unvi-
able alternative. In Indonesia and Pakistan there was an internal dyna-
mism demanding reform. Those deemed Communists or Socialists by 
successive U.S. administrations were, in fact, moderates committed to 
democratization. They were the reformers in need of foreign support. 
Over and over again, U.S. Cold War myopia resulted in backing the 
wrong side. Today in the Middle East there will be no transformation 
until the West answers the simple questions being asked on the street: 
Why Iraq and not Saudi Arabia? Why blanket support for Israel and 
blindness to Palestinian suffering?
This is why I reject the civilizational theses of Huntington and 
Islamist ideologues who also believe that the difference of religion and 
blood is the determining divide in the modern world. And I reject the 
deracinated “house Muslims” in the North American and European 
diasporas, so desperate to please, so eager to be integrated on any basis 
that they sink to their knees and join the sickly chorus, winning the 
earthly rewards of media attention and tenure. At the top of this heap 
lies Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi handmaiden to the White House opera-
tives.
One point is repeatedly made by professors of human rights on U.S. 
campuses and by “civil society” groups in order to justify Western 
interventions, including the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is that 
democracy and the plurality of institutions independent of the state, 
but rooted in capitalism, define the culture of the West. In 1919, an 
anti-imperialist wind arose in Afghanistan and the tribal confederacy 
accepted Amanullah as the king. He was a modernizer and admirer 
of Kemal Ataturk. His wife Soraya was a proto-feminist. The national-
ist intellectuals in Amanullah’s circle prepared a draft constitution. It 
included universal adult franchise. If it had been implemented, women 
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in Afghanistan would have obtained the vote before their sisters in 
Britain and the West. The reason it wasn’t implemented was that the 
British, via the experienced agent T. E. Lawrence, stoked up a few 
tribes, paid them, and told them that women were being encouraged to 
become prostitutes. The British themselves then intervened to topple 
Amanullah.
Ironically, as the culture of democratic life deteriorates in the West, 
there is a growing demand for self-expression in much of the Muslim 
world. The citizens of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Syria 
and the Gulf statelets, are desperate to choose their own governments, 
but there is a problem. It is what Huntington has referred to as “the 
democratic paradox.” In plain language, democracy might produce 
elected governments hostile to the U.S. This is true. It might. That’s 
why Washington prefers the kleptocratic Saudi dynasty and the moth-
eaten military regime in Egypt.
And Iraq? The appointment of Iyad Allawi, an ex-CIA agent, as the 
new prime minister, and the infamous Cold War hawk John Negro-
ponte as the new U.S. ambassador, is an indication of the tortures that 
lie ahead for the citizens of Iraq. The demand for an elected constitu-
ent assembly (first put forward by Ayatollah Sistani) is straight out of 
the French Revolution. But it would probably produce a government 
that would unite the country on the basis of two clear-cut aims: the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops and Iraqi control of Iraqi oil. To have 
occupied a country and then watch it flout the Washington Consensus 
would be too painful. So puppets are appointed and the resistance 
continues.
Meanwhile, in neighboring Iran, a decrepit clerical regime is increas-
ingly isolated from the population. Sixty-three percent of the people 
are under thirty years of age. All they have known is the rule of the 
clerics. They want something different. Despite the clerics, Iran has 
a vibrant semi-clandestine culture. The Iranian new-wave cinema is 
flourishing and, as enthusiastic exploiters of the Internet, Iran’s dissi-
dent bloggers dominate cyberspace. While the clerics continue to sup-
press free speech (closing down dissident newspapers such as Neshat), 
such reprisals are addressed in courts of law. Iran offers hope. When 
the clerics are defeated, the people of this country who accepted the 
leadership of the mullahs to get rid of the Shah might inaugurate a ref-
ormation with far-reaching effects. I would not be surprised if mosque 
and state were divided forever after another upheaval in Iran. In the 
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current climate, Iranian self-emancipation would be seriously delayed 
or halted by foreign intervention.
Recall that in 1995, Zalmay Khalilzad (currently the proconsul in 
Kabul and busy negotiating deals with Taliban factions to preserve his 
puppet protegé) published an essay in which he suggested that U.S. 
hegemony had to be preserved at all costs, if necessary by force. Sep-
tember 11 provided the opportunity to try out the theory. For President 
Bush II, Ahmed Chalabi provided a perfect bookend to this history, but 
Iraq is proof that the use of force can provoke a mighty resistance.
Cultures and civilizations are now, and have always been, hybrids. 
To suggest otherwise is to fall prey to the twin devils of ideology and 
chauvinism. The tragedy of the abuses at Abu Ghraib is that they cre-
ated a clash of civilizations where no such clash had existed. Through 
its own myopia, the West has given radical Islam the ammunition for 
which it was thirsting. In the short term, President Bush will insist that 
his hands are clean and that the forces of darkness are behind every 
door. If this blindness and these lies persist, the long-term prospects 
are too desperate to contemplate. •
Notes
1. The German text of Kautsky’s piece was published in Die Neue Zeit on September 11, 
1914. It was translated into English for the first time by the New Left Review, and pub-
lished as “Ultra-Imperialism,” New Left Review 59 (January–February 1970).
2. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
3. Ibid.
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